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Administrative Law. Blais v. Rhode Island Airport Corp., 212
A.3d 604 (R.I. 2019). The Rhode Island Airport Corporation (RIAC)
must issue a formal order in accordance with the statutory
requirements of the Uniform Aeronautical Regulatory Act (UARA)
to ban an individual from the premises of one of its airports. 1 RIAC
could not make a case moot by conditionally lifting a disputed ban
to prevent an individual from entering one of its airports.2
FACTS AND TRAVEL
RIAC is a “subsidiary public corporation” 3 of the Rhode Island
Commerce Corporation. 4 RIAC’s director, Kelly Fredericks
(Fredericks),5 manages and operates several Rhode Island
airports. 6 Kevin Blais (Blais) purchased a gate key in 2010 to one
of the airports operated by RIAC and directed by Fredericks—
North Central State Airport (North Central) in Smithfield. 7 The
gate key allowed Blais to store his airplane and access the airfield
at North Central, and he regularly accessed the airport for several
years.8 Blais’s behavior during those years led RIAC to issue a notrespass letter on February 14, 2014, informing him that he could
no longer enter the airport. 9
1. Blais v. R.I. Airport Corp., 212 A.3d 604, 618 (R.I. 2019).
2. Id. at 613.
3. Id. at 607 (quoting 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-64-7.1).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. The letter stated: “Please be advised that you are not allowed to
enter the premises of North Central State Airport. If you ignore the directive,
you will be deemed a trespasser pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws
Section 11-44-26 and RIAC will take appropriate legal action.” Days after
issuance of the no-trespass letter, Blais entered North Central for a safety
seminar, and airport police removed him from the premises. Id. at 608.
Following that incident, the District Court tried and convicted Blais for
criminal trespass. He appealed to the Superior Court, but the case was

527

528 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:527
RIAC scheduled a hearing in June of 2015 to discuss the
possibility of ending the ban against Blais.10 Ten witnesses
testified about Blais’ behavior, most testifying that his actions
“made them feel at best, uncomfortable, and at worst, unsafe.” 11
Based on the testimony, the hearing officer issued a report in
September 2015 that determined Blais would continue to be banned
from North Central due to safety concerns. 12 On October 8, 2015,
Fredericks sent Blais a letter, that was allegedly a final order,
stating that he was banned from entering North Central, but could
still access other RIAC facilities. 13 However, Blais would be able to
enter North Central in an “aviation emergency.” 14 The letter also
stated that the determination would be reviewed in six months at
another hearing.15 Attached to the letter was a document labeled
“Notice of Appeal Rights of Party Aggrieved by Final Order of
Director,” which notified Blais that under the Administrative
Procedures Act, he could appeal the order in Superior Court within
thirty days after the order was mailed. 16
Blais appealed to the Superior Court on November 6, 2015,
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. 17 While the trial court
did not award such relief, it found that the February 2014 notrespass letter and the October 2015 order, which continued the

dismissed by the Attorney General before the court could decide whether to
grant a new trial. Id.
10. Id. at 608. Blais did not attend the hearing, but an attorney appeared
on his behalf. Id.
11. Id. The Court described the testimony of witnesses who testified at
the hearing, providing details about eight witnesses who described negative
encounters with Blais and one witness who felt that Blais’s behavior was
justified by the way he was treated by others at the airport. Id. at 609–10.
12. Id. at 610.
13. Id.
14. Id. This order stated:
I am writing to advise you that I have adopted the findings, conclusion
and recommendations of the [hearing officer]. As such, you are
directed to remain off the premises of the North Central State Airport.
You may use any of the other Rhode Island Airport Corporation
Facilities, and may use North Central State Airport in the event of an
aviation emergency.
Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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February 2014 ban, were not valid. 18 RIAC’s February 2014 letter
failed to “state the reasons for the order or provide the requirements
that needed to be met before the order might be modified,” which is
required under the Uniform Aeronautical Regulatory Act (UARA) 19
to be a valid final order. 20 Because the original February 2014
letter was invalid and the October 2015 order claimed to extend the
ban created by the February 2014 letter, the October 2015 order
was also invalid.21 RIAC petitioned the Rhode Island Supreme
Court (the Court) to issue a writ of certiorari, which the Court
granted on November 27, 2017. 22
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Court first determined the standard of review appropriate
in an administrative appeal. 23 The Court stated that it reviews
questions of law de novo, while deferring to the RIAC hearing
officer’s findings of fact.24
As an initial matter, the Court considered whether the case
was moot, because during the course of the litigation, RIAC had
issued an order that would allow Blais to enter North Central
again. 25 The Court issued an order on April 4, 2019 asking the
parties “to advise this Court, within five days of the date of this
order, of any action pending in any other court that might directly
or indirectly relate to this appeal, including the relief sought in
In response, the parties submitted Blais’s
those cases.” 26
complaints, which included “a 2016 administrative appeal in the
Superior Court, No. KC–2016–0724, and a 2017 civil action in the
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.” 27
Blais claimed that while the instant case was pending, RIAC held
a hearing and decided to remove the no-trespass order, though that

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting 1 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1-4-15).
Id. at 610–11.
Id. at 611.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 612.
Id.
Id.
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decision would be reviewed in six months. 28 Blais argued that the
case was not moot because he was not returned to the position he
was in before the ban; RIAC could decide to ban him again in the
later hearing. 29 Based on these facts, the Court agreed with Blais
and decided that the case was not moot.30
The Court then turned to the merits of the case. The Court
first addressed whether, as Blais argued, RIAC did not have the
authority to ban him from North Central without a final order.31
RIAC presented two arguments to support its belief that a final
order was unnecessary. 32 First, RIAC argued that the UARA only
gave RIAC authority to issue orders related to “generally applicable
aeronautical regulation,” and the ban placed on Blais was not an
aeronautical regulation that would require a formal order. 33 The
Court rejected this argument, finding that the statute does require
a final order for matters beyond aeronautical regulation, including
matters of safety and efficiency. 34 Second, RIAC argued that if it
followed the requirements of a final order under the UARA, it would
make it challenging for RIAC to address time sensitive safety
issues. 35 The Court found that the procedural requirements set
forth by the UARA would not prevent RIAC from handling
immediate threats to security because, in those situations, the final
order requirement could be bypassed. 36 Altogether, RIAC failed to
allege that Blais actually violated a law or regulation and created a
time sensitive issue that would allow RIAC to remove him without
issuing a final order.37 The Court concluded that RIAC could not
ban individuals from its airports without following the
requirements described in section 1-4-15 of the General Laws. 38
The Court then addressed whether RIAC issued a final order
to Blais in accordance with the requirements of the UARA. 39 The
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 613.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 613–14.
Id. at 613.
Id. at 614.
Id. at 613–14.
Id. at 614.
Id. at 614–15.
Id. at 615.
Id.
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Court decided that for the order to be enforceable, RIAC’s director
needed to state “his or her reasons for the order and state the
requirements to be met before approval is given or the rule,
regulation, or order shall be modified or changed.” 40 The order
must also “be mailed to, or served upon, that person” who is the
subject to the order and it must be “kept on file with the secretary
of state.” 41 The Court found that the February 2014 letter was
invalid because it did not include the requirements necessary for
Blais to change the ban, RIAC’s director did not sign the letter, it
did not give any statutory basis for the ban, and it was not
presented as a final order from RIAC’s director.42 Although the
trial court reasoned that the October 2015 order was not valid
because it extended the invalid February 2014 letter’s ban, the
Court analyzed the October 2015 order independently to decide
whether it could be an enforceable order under the statute. 43 The
Court said that although the order might state the reasons for
imposing the ban, it nonetheless failed to state the requirements
for modifying or changing the order, which made it invalid under
the statute. 44 RIAC argued that it could not predict the
circumstances under which it would remove the ban, but the Court
stated that the statute includes this requirement, so RIAC could
not ignore it simply because it might be burdensome.45 Because
neither the 2014 letter nor the 2015 order met all of the
requirements set forth by the UARA, neither were enforceable final
orders. 46
Having determined that RIAC needed to adhere to the
requirements of the UARA and that it failed to do so, the Court
addressed RIAC’s final argument that Blais’s claim was barred
because he failed to timely appeal the February 2014 letter. 47
However, the Court found that the February 2014 letter was not a
final order, and Blais did appeal the October 2015 purportedly
“final order” within thirty days, as required by the Administrative
40. Id. (quoting 1 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1-4-15).
41. Id. at 616 (quoting 1 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1-4-11).
42. Id. at 616.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 616–17.
45. Id. at 617.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Procedures Act. 48 The Court concluded that RIAC’s final argument
failed because Blais appealed in a timely fashion and the orders did
not comport with the requirements of the statute, thus deciding
that the Superior Court correctly decided that RIAC’s ban was
unenforceable. 49
COMMENTARY
Justice Robinson concurred in part and dissented in part from
the majority’s decision. Justice Robinson believed that the case was
moot and the majority’s analysis of the merits of the case was
unnecessary. 50 According to Justice Robinson’s reasoning, since
RIAC was no longer imposing a ban on Blais, the Court could no
longer provide him any relief; therefore, the Court should not have
gone any further into its analysis. 51 Justice Robinson noted that
although the majority relied on an order that supposedly said that
RIAC’s removal of the ban would be reviewed six months after
lifting the order, the Court did not receive that order and should
not have based its decision on documentation that it never saw.52
Despite determining that the case should be moot, Justice
Robinson evaluated the majority’s decisions on the merits.53
Justice Robinson agreed with the majority that RIAC must adhere
to the requirements of the UARA when issuing a permanent ban,
but he believed that RIAC may issue a temporary ban without
meeting the requirements of the statute to protect airport safety.54
The February 2014 letter and October 2015 order at issue in
this case were, without question, not final orders under the UARA
because neither included the necessary elements required by the
statute. 55 The controversy between the majority and the dissent in
this case turns on whether or not the case was moot and whether
or not the UARA requirements should be applied to all orders
banning individuals from RIAC airports. 56
48. Id. at 618.
49. Id.
50. Id. (Robinson J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
51. Id. at 618–19.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 620.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 622.
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RIAC attempted to avoid litigation by lifting the ban on Blais,
but RIAC nonetheless retained the ability to potentially impose the
ban again at a later date.57 The majority argued that the case was
not moot because the potential for future harm did not leave Blais
in the position he was in prior to the 2014 letter. 58 However,
Justice Robinson argued that the majority was essentially issuing
an advisory opinion because Blais was no longer banned from North
Central and the Court could not grant any relief. 59 Justice
Robinson’s understanding of the mootness issue is supported by the
fact that the Rhode Island Superior Court decided not to grant
Blais’s request for injunctive or declaratory relief; it simply found
that the 2014 letter and the 2015 order were invalid. 60 Although
the Court was incapable of granting the relief sought by Blais by
the time it decided the case, the Court recognized that without
explaining the requirements of the statute, RIAC was at risk of
issuing another invalid ban in the future. 61
Justice Robinson’s other point of contention with the majority’s
opinion was that the majority stated that the requirements of the
UARA should apply to all orders banning individuals from the
premises, while Justice Robinson believed that the UARA
requirements should only apply to permanent bans. 62 Justice
Robinson recognized the letter and order in this particular case as
permanent bans, but he believed that the Court should have
differentiated between the requirements for temporary and
permanent bans.63 According to Justice Robinson, issuing a
temporary ban to protect the safety and effective operation of the
airports falls within the authority of RIAC’s director and he or she
should not have to follow all of the statutory requirements to
address a time-sensitive safety concern. 64 Justice Robinson felt as
though the majority was “putting form over substance” by expecting
the RIAC director to comply with the statute in all instances.65
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 613 (majority opinion).
Id.
See id. at 619 (Robinson J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See id. at 610–11 (majority opinion).
Id. at 613.
Id. at 621 (Robinson J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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However, differentiating between temporary and permanent bans
raises another question: if statutory requirements are not
necessary for temporary bans, what are the proper procedures for
issuing a temporary no-trespass order? The majority emphasized
that the statute was written to include all orders “requiring or
prohibiting certain things to be done,” so it appears that the
legislature has made it clear that there is no difference in how RIAC
should handle temporary and permanent bans.66 The majority
actually seems to agree with Justice Robinson that RIAC could
“temporarily eject persons from any airport, without issuing a final
order, for behavior that poses an immediate disturbance or pressing
threat.” 67 It is unclear under what circumstances the Court would
find that there is enough of a security risk that RIAC could forego
the requirements of the UARA; however, because there was no
evidence of a time sensitive security threat in this case, that issue
would need to be determined at another time.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court held that the Rhode Island Superior Court
correctly decided that Blais’s case was not moot because RIAC could
choose to reimpose the ban set forth by the invalid orders. RIAC’s
purportedly final orders, in the February 2014 letter and the
October 2015 order, were invalid because they did not meet the
UARA’s statutory requirements for a final order.
Sarah Friedman

66.
67.

Id. at 617 (majority opinion).
Id. at 614.

